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I. INTRODUCTION
Men have beaten their wives and partners for centuries with no
retribution from the criminal justice system.' Only recently has
domestic violence been targeted by the government as a problem
warranting criminal sanctions.2 For example, in the past two decades
many states have enacted mandatory arrest statutes.' These statutes
are designed to send the message that domestic violence is unaccept-
able and will be punished severely. Although many feminists argue
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course, all remaining errors are my own.
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law and always encouraged me to speak my mind.
1. See generally, Developments in the Lau-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498, 1502 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence] (describing the history
of domestic violence and the inadequate legal response to this widespread problem).
This paper only discusses heterosexual domestic violence. While I am aware of lesbian and
gay battering, a discussion of that problem is beyond the scope of this analysis.
2. See id. (noting that only within the last 25 years have adequate legal remedies become
available to battered women).
3. Mandatory arrest laws eliminate police discretion in responding to domestic violence
by requiring that the police arrest the offender if there is probable cause to believe that an
offense occurred. Carol Wright, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or
Alternative, 14 CAP. U.L REv. 243, 253 (1985); see infra note 44 and accompanying text (citing
states that have mandatory arrest statutes).
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for mandatory arrest laws in order to address crimes against women,4
these laws also perpetuate racist law enforcement.5
This article analyzes the interconnections between gender and race
and evaluates state and feminist responses to domestic violence in
terms of this analysis. As a feminist and an aspiring criminal defense
attorney, I confront the contradiction between the desire to end the
subordination of women and the desire to work toward a new model
of the criminal justice system-one that does not mete out punish-
ment based upon factors such as race, class, and gender.'
Domestic violence is clearly a very serious problem in the United
States; one which activists must work to end.' In spite of the best
intentions of many domestic violence activists, who are mostly white
women, the interests of many Black women are not served by asking
the state for protection such as mandatory arrest laws.' The criminal
4. SeeWright, supra note 3, at 253 (listing the goals of mandatory arrest advocates, which
include victims of domestic violence receiving "prompt, effective aid from the police and court
system").
5. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing how mandatory arrest laws allow
the perpetuation of racist law enforcement).
6. Kathleen Daly aptly illustrates the contradiction between the desire to end violence
against women and the desire to eradicate racism in the criminal justice system:
As feminists seek a larger role for the state in protecting women and children from
abusive men, we should ask, what role is desirable? We might also see the danger in
reconstructing criminal law andjustice practices from the standpoint of victims alone.
A victim-centered strategy can easly [sic] lead to a feminist law and order stance, and
we should be wary of this for several reasons. It can spill over to a more punitive
treatment of women defendants, and it can have especially harsh consequences for
racial or ethnic minority men.
Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions
About Justice; 17 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 1, 13 (1989). Daly calls for a feminist conception of criminal
justice which does not ignore the factors of race and class. Id.
7. In the United States, an estimated four million women are battered by their partners
each year. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Violence Against Women:
Relevancefor Medical Practitioners, 262 JAMA 3184, 3185 (1992). A survey of married couples in
1985 estimated that 3,400,000 relationships involved severe violence. MURRAY A. STRAUS &
RICHARD J. GELi.Es, How Violent Are American Families? Estimates From the National Family Violence
Resurvey and Other Studies, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMiLIES: RISK FAfrORS AND
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 95,97 (1990). Straus and Gelles suggest that "rates
could be as much as double" as those reported and estimated. Id. Elizabeth Schneider points
out that "[a]buse of women by male partners is the leading cause of injury to women in the
United States." Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory
and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 523 (1992). More recently, Demie
Kurz, co-director of the women's studies program at the University of Pennsylvania, stated that
"an estimated 3,000 women are killed each year by their husbands or boyfriends." Judy Mann,
The Lessons of Lorena, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at E3.
8. Pamela Smith analyzes the effect of high incarceration rates of Black men on Black
women, noting that while white women may consider disproportionate incarceration of Black
men unfortunate, Black women are more likely to be personally affected by these statistics.
Pamela J. Smith, We Are Not Sisters: African-American Women and the Freedom to Associate and
Disassociate, 66 TUL. L REV. 1467, 1488 n.138 (1992). She points out that these men are the
"brothers, fathers, uncles, nephews, and potential mates for the African-American woman." Id.
Smith proposes that Black women should at times disassociate from white women due to racism
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justice system has always targeted Black people. As a result, Blacks
experience unjust criminal sanctions.9 When battered women's
advocates turn to the police for aid and support tougher laws and
punitive measures, they deny the complexity of a problem which
involves issues of race as well as gender. Domestic violence activists,
therefore, must also challenge the racism endemic in our criminal
justice system.
Part II briefly examines some of the historical tensions between
Black" and white women. Part III provides a brief history of
domestic violence and explores how it affects Black and white women
differently. Part IV discusses Ways in which both the government and
women's advocacy groups have responded to domestic violence. Part
V examines the recent movement calling for mandatory arrest in
domestic violence situations and suggests that this movement
and their differences with white women. Id.
I reluctantly include an explanation here of why I choose to focus on Black women and not
include all "minorities"-or even mention "Asians" and "Latinos"-in this discussion. Most
progressive literature on women's issues tends to group all minorities together as people with
the same conditions as "women." Women used in this context clearly means white women, since
women are part of every minority group. I focus on Blacks because they have particular
historical, social, political, and economic conditions in the United States that other minority
groups do not. Even though these other groups have suffered, and continue to suffer, great
oppression as well, the conditions of Blacks are different, not necessarily better or worse. I also
think it is an insult to Black men and women to merge their particular history with the history
of all "minorities," rather than allowing Black history and social conditions to stand on their
own. This may be applied equally to any discussion of "Asians" and "Latinos"-Vietnamese,
Chinese, andJapanese people are different culturally, historically, and socially from each other,
as are Cubans, Salvadorans, and Peruvians from each other.
9. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 340 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that
Black men are more likely than white men to be killed, shot, or wounded by police, and more
likely to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law). Almost one in four black men between
ages 20 and 30 are involved with the criminal justice system, as compared to 1 in 16 white men.
Id. Statistics reveal further that Black offenders are more likely to be convicted and sentenced
than similarly situated white offenders. Id. at 340 n.36.
10. I use the word Black rather than African-American, but do not in any way mean that
racism and racist oppression are based merely on "skin color." While some choose the term
African-American to denote a particular history and culture, I use Black with the same
understanding. I capitalize the word Black intentionally, and borrow from Catharine
MacKinnon the reasons for this: "I do not regard Black as merely a color of skin pigmentation,
but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and personal identity. It acquires its meaning under
specific social conditions, one of which is racism, one of which is politically self-conscious
struggle against racism." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not By Law Alone: From A Debate With Phyllis
Schlafly (1982), in FEMINISM UNIODIFtED: DIscoURsES ON LIFE AND LAW 21, 25 n.12 (1987).
Addressing the reason for not capitalizing "white", MacKinnon states that being white does not
involve "affirmative self-identification." Id. Furthermore, "[c]apitalizing [white] would ...
communicate an equality that is now false, and would take no side toward making the equality
a true one." Id.
Angela Harris relates a personal story in a feminist setting which illustrates the very real
difference between white and Black women: "At a 1988 meeting of the West Coast 'fem-crits,'
Pat Cain and Trina Grillo asked all the women present to pick out two or three words to
describe who they were. None of the white women mentioned their race; all of the women of
color did." Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theoiy, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581,603
(1990).
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unwittingly serves to increase racial oppression. Part V contends
further that mandatory arrest does not deter domestic violence from
recurring, refuting an argument commonly advanced in favor of
mandatory arrest policies. Part VI concludes by offering an altema-
tive, feminist model to arrest and prosecution, maintaining that a new
vision of the role of the criminal justice system is needed in order to
effectively combat domestic violence.
II. SOURCES OF TENSION BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN
In order to fully assess the problems of mandatory arrest programs,
it is necessary to engage in an analysis of the historical and current
antagonisms between Black and white women in their relationship to
the law. This article suggests that attempts to protect women via the
criminal justice system conflict with concerns about racial oppression
in the criminal justice system, particularly in the areas of rape and
domestic violence. Several feminist theorists have noted that there is
a conflict between the feminist goals of eradicating domestic violence
and achieving racial justice."
Many feminist lawyers and law students will agree that the criminal
justice system is racist, and, despite some recent changes, sexist.'2
Yet when these same feminists are presented with a hypothetical rape
or domestic violence situation, they often respond with a strong
reaction that suggests that the gender oppression evident in those
crimes is somehow more important, or at least more personal, than
the racist oppression of the criminal justice system." By actively
working with the criminal justice system to protect all women from
violence, white women reinforce their racial privilege over Black men
and women and, consequently, maintain a place for white women as
11. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L 1, 35 (1993) (suggesting that Black women experience a conflict between an
alliance with Black men in their pursuit of racial justice, and an alliance with white women in
their pursuit of gender equality). Roberts, a Black feminist, notes that:
[o]ur unity with men in the struggle for Black liberation is grounded in the reality that
being Black in America is part of our identity, critical to what it means for us to be
women. We are bound to Black men through the day-to-day struggles of living in a
racist society. We know that our liberation as women is linked to the liberation of
Black people as a group.
Id. See also SuSAN SCmCER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 275 (1982) (quoting Curdina Hill's
statement that "[w]e are dealing with an entire people, including men, who are racially and
ethnically oppressed. We can't separate out the inequities against us as women and those due
to race and class.").
12. This observation comes from personal conversations with my colleagues in law school.
13. In her critique of Catharine MacKiniton's "color-blind" approach to rape, Angela Harris
states that MacKinnon "simultaneously recognizes and shelves racism, finally reaffirming that the
divide between men and women is more fundamental and that women of color are simply
'women plus'." Harris, supra note 10, at 597.
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oppressors of Black women and men. 4 Therefore, white women
must consciously assess their alliances with the state to ensure that
they do not inadvertently contribute to the oppression of other
groups, including Black women.
A. An Overview of White Women's Domination Over Black Women
Although the focus of this paper is the relationship of white and
Black women in the context of domestic violence, an examination of
other areas in which white women dominate Black women is useful
for gaining a perspective on their relationship. Tensions between
Black and white women started during slavery, and escalated during
the 20th century women's liberation movement.' During slavery,
the state was prepared to protect the white race through the
patriarchal notion of vulnerable white womanhood," but it was not
prepared to extend protection to white women in the framework of
domestic violence. 7
White women had an interest in preserving their social status as
oppressors of Black men and women, but at the same time the white
supremacist patriarchy relegated white women to an inferior social
status to that of white men." Historically, the interests of white
women as a group were linked to the racial oppression of Blacks,
rather than to the liberation of Black women from white supremacist
14. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1473 (stating that "white women can be as racist as white
men"). As Smith notes:
[a]lthough white women have been the victims of sexist oppression, a white woman's
race determines to what extent she will be dominated and to what extent she can
dominate. Being oppressed does not mean that one cannot be an oppressor as well.
White feminists have labored under the misconception that by identifying themselves
as oppressed, they are unable to oppress.
Id. bell hooks explains that "white racial imperialism grants all white women, however victimized
by sexist oppression they might be, the right to assume the role of oppressor in relationship to
black women and black men." BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I AWOMAN? BLACKWoMEN AND FEMINISM 123
(1981).
15. HOOKS, supra note 14, at 153.
16. The complexity of white women's oppression of Black women is evident in the context
of slavery. "[Tihe cruelty white men inflicted on female slaves in the presence of white women
served as a warning to their wives, sisters, and daughters to remain obedient .... Thus, the
subjugation of Black women encouraged white women's allegiance to the patriarchy." Roberts,
supra note 11, at 30-31.
17. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 31 (suggesting that white women had a stake in the
maintenance of this system because it allowed them clearly defined racial privileges over their
slaves). Roberts explains that the patriarchy protected white women from both Black men and
the injustices suffered by Black women slaves. This complicated relationship ensured white
women's "acquiescence in their own inferior status." Id.; see also HOOKS, supra note 14, at 93
(asserting that Black women also supported and accepted the patriarchy, because of their rage
at Black men's refusal to assume the role of the sole economic provider in the family-a role
that the white male assumed).
18. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 30 (stating that some white women compensated for their
inferior status by exerting power over slaves owned by their husbands).
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male domination. This historical relationship continues to be the
basis for white women's privilege over Black women.
1 9
Conflicts between white and Black women transcend the criminal
context, permeating many other spheres. Perhaps these tensions are
better understood as manifestations of the inequalities that exist
between white and Black women. For example, throughout history
poverty and unemployment rates have been and continue to be
higher for Black women than for white women.2' Discord between
Black and white women has also resulted in the fragmentation of
"women's" organizations. In the 1920s and 1930s, when Black women
asked the National Women's Party for its support with their right-to-
vote campaign, the "white feminists rejected their petitions, arguing
that this was a race concern and not a women's concern."2
Pamela Smith describes another example of this organizational
exclusion. She recounts an incident where a group of women of
color walked out in protest of an annual meeting of the National
Women's Studies Association.22  They asserted that "white women
had ignored their cries and pleas for equal time."23 The women of
color created a separate organization, tentatively called the Interna-
tional Women of Color Association.24
The mainstream feminist movement today has made attempts to
redress the past and include issues of racial justice in its agenda.
Nevertheless, there are still underlying prejudices which infiltrate
mainstream actions. One recent example was the national pro-choice
19. Roberts, supra note 11, at 31. The alliance of white women with the patriarchy allowed
them to ignore the racism that, in part, motivated the attacks on Black women. Id.
20. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding a Place, Asserting Our
Rights, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L Rav. 9, 9 (1989) ("[T]he poverty rates for black women, even
controlling for age and education, are higher than the poverty rates for white women and black
men."). Unemployment patterns also disproportionately affect Black women. This latter
problem has become worse in the last thirty years. While in the 1960s Black women were twice
as likely to be jobless as white women, they were four times as likely by the 1980s. Mary Huff
Stevenson, Barry Bluestone & Chris Tilly, Labor Market Outcomes of Young Black and White
Women: The 1960s and the 1980s 9 (May 15-16, 1992) (presented at the Third Women's Policy
Research Conference) (unpublished manuscript on file with The American University Journal of
Gender & the Law). Black women also earn less than white women. In 1991, Black women's
median weekly earnings were $323, compared to $374 forwhite women. Janita Poe, Black Women
Join to Chip Away at Their Unique Problems, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 1992, at Cl.
21. Elsa Barkley Brown, Womanist Consciousness: MaggieLena Walker and theIndependent Order
of Saint Luke, 14 SIGNS 610, 612 (1989). Brown suggests that such fragmentation encouraged the
establishment of a false dichotomy between racism and sexism. Id.
22. Smith, supra note 8, at 1479.
23. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1479 (claiming that historical treatment of Black women in
the women's movement has involved the perpetuation of inequality between Black and white
women, and the denial of racism).
24. Smith, supra note 8, at 1479-80 n.76.
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march of April 1992.1 The National Organization for Women
(NOW) was the leading organizer of this march. Latina, Black, and
indigenous women's groups were angry that their voices were not
included among the principal organizers. Some representatives of
these groups were asked to speak at the march, but they were not
included among the board that sponsored the march, nor were they
able to make policy decisions for the march.26 Patricia Ireland,
President of NOW, emphasized that individual women of color served
on NOW's board.' Individual tokenism, however, will not improve
the conditions for the vast majority of Black women; rather, only
collective community power will help advance the struggle for
equality.
Although many white and Black women desire a women's move-
ment that transcends race and class, the reality has been anger and
mistrust among women. As Black women organize and struggle
against racist and sexist subjugation, white women must recognize the
power over Black women that their racial privilege confers. The call
for mandatory arrest and subsequent prosecution stems from an
understandable desire to have crimes against women treated as
seriously as other crimes.21 In the context of a criminal justice
system that already treats offenders differently because of race,
class,' and gender, however, it is not truly feminist to demand for
more prosecution because it ultimately excludes Black women from
the feminist struggle."
25. See Who's Sony NOW? Women of ColorProtest Pro-Choi March, MS.,July/Aug. 1992, at 88-89
(investigating the tension between NOW leader Patricia Ireland and leaders of groups such as
the National Black Women's Health Project, the Native American Women's Health Education
Resource Center, and the National Latina Health Organization).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LAW 242
(1989) (noting that in the late 1970s the goal of the women's movement was to "make legal
decision-makers treat domestic violence as a significant criminal offense").
29. Although class disparity is a critical element of racial oppression, I do not specifically
discuss class in this paper because I believe that race is the principal factor in the oppression
of Black men and women. It is essential to discuss racial oppression first because being
identified as middle-class or upper-class does not automatically eliminate the vestiges of racial
discrimination. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1478 (noting that "membership in the African-
American middle-class provides no protection from racism").
30. SeeJennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S UJ. 103, 137-38
(1983) (stating that the feminist goal of increasing rape convictions only perpetuates racism in
the criminal justice system and furthers white feminists' supremacy over Black women); see also
Smith, supra note 8, at 1472 (quoting, in the context of women's solidarity, Angela Davis, who
observed that racism must be addressed thoroughly in order to achieve "empowerment for the
masses of women in our country").
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B. Black Women and White Women: Their Divergent Perspectives of the
Role of the Criminal Justice System
The racist legacy of the crimina justice system" cannot be ignored
when battered women's advocates propose to use that system as a
solution to the problem of violence against women. The relationship
of Black men and women to the criminal justice and legal system
continues to be quite antagonistic. Since the days of slavery, the
conduct of Black men has been criminalized, while sympathetic police
have permitted white men to escape arrest.1
2
The criminal justice system continues to provide Black women with
less protection than white women. Black women suffer greater harm
at the hand of the judicial system in various contexts. When a Black
woman is raped, regardless of whether the accused is white or Black,
the police do not take her case as seriously as when the victim is a
white woman.3" Likewise, a pregnant Black woman who is found to
be addicted to drugs or alcohol when arrested or arraigned is much
more likely to be convicted of a crime than a similarly situated white
woman.
34
In contrast, white women's relationship to the criminal justice
system is ambivalent because the patriarchal law serves as both
oppressor and protector of white women. 5 The criminal justice
31. See BELL, supra note 9, at 338 (asserting that the criminal justice system has imposed
discriminatory criminal sanctions on Blacks since the days of slavery, when Slave Codes
established separate and more severe punishment for slaves).
32. See Tony Jefferson, Discriminatior, Disadvantage and Police Work, in OUT OF ORDER?
POLICING BLACK PEOPLE 178 (Ellis Cashmore & Eugene McLaughlin eds., 1991) (stating that
police records and public surveys, relating mostly to London, suggest that Black males are more
likely to be stopped than white males); BELL supra note 9, at 340 (concluding that the police
power to stop and frisk has been a powerful tool for harassing Black and Latino citizens); Lynne
Duke, Wen Race is Equated with Craie, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at A3 (discussing how the
police rely on race as an indicator of criminal suspects).
33. See Wriggins, supra note 30, at 117 (noting that racism and sexism have denied the
notion that Black women could be raped from the time of slavery to the present day). Law
enforcement officers take Black women's claims of rape less seriously than those ofwhite women
because of a perceived lack of credibility and myths concerning Black sexuality. Id. at 122.
The case of Desiree Washington's successful prosecution of Mike Tyson for rape is a recent
example of a court recognizing that a Black woman can be raped. See Michael Madden,Justice
Served In Heartland, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1992, at 43 (commenting that the Tyson case was
a watershed in date rape cases because an unknown complainant was successful in prosecuting
one of the world's most famous athletes). Had her accused rapist been a white man, especially
a famous sports figure, the chances of a conviction would have been slim. See generally PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA 117 (1984) (stating thatwhite men are rarely convicted of raping Blackwomen because
of the perception that Black women have been and are still sexually accessible to white men).
34. SeeJacqueline Berrien, Pregnany and Drug Use: TheDangerous and Unequal Use ofPunitive
Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 239, 240 (1990) (explaining the historical acceptance of
racially-based justifications for governmental coercion).
35. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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system has protected white women in cases of stranger rape when the
accused perpetrator was Black, 6 but offered little relief in cases
when the accused was white.' Mandatory arrest laws will inevitably
result in increased prosecution and consequently, increased oppres-
sion for Black men and women in the criminal justice system.
Some advocates argue that mandatory arrest policies benefit all
women equally because women suffer discrimination based on their
gender and not their ethnic or racial identity. A bitter debate has
ensued over whether women can be stripped bare of their race and
class, to be left with a gender identity that is essentially "woman,"
transcending all other socially constructed identities.' Feminists
refer to the reduction of women's experiences to those based only on
gender as gender essentialism. 9
When theorizing about women, one must avoid the tendency to
understand "woman" as an "essential" identity; reducing gender to an
"essential" form, devoid of any ethnic or racial identities, hinders
one's ability to see the oppression that women can impose on other
women by virtue of their race. Proponents of mandatory arrest policy,
who are also gender essentialists, do not fully acknowledge that white
women can indeed be the oppressors of Black men and women in
their alliance with the state.'
The interconnection of racial and sexual domination means that
white women can simultaneously be oppressed and be oppressors.
This is apparent in the context of current domestic violence policy,
where white women can be oppressed in their abusive relationships,
and at the same time, participate in the state's oppression of Black
men by calling on the criminal justice system to mandate arrest in
36. See GIDDINGS, supra note 33, at 27-28 (discussing the widely-held belief that Black men
had a particular proclivity for raping white women, which was used in many cases as a
justification for lynching Black men).
37. See GIDDINGS supra note 33, at 27-28 (declaring that the patriarchal court system treats
white defendants with more leniency than Black defendants due to the legacy of racism and
property rights).
38. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 2 n.6 (characterizing Catharine MacKinnon as a gender
essentialist because MacKinnon understands the system of gender domination to include all
women in the same way, although women actually experience this domination in different ways).
See also Harris, supra note 10, at 585 (arguing that both Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West
rely on "gender essentialism," thereby silencing the voice of Black women's experiences).
39. See Harris, supra note 10, at 585 (defining gender essentialism as "the notion that a
unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience.").
40. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theoy, or What is a White Woman Anyway?,
4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISMi 13, 15 (1991) (describing treatment "as a woman" without explicit
mention of race). MacKinnon writes that the "subordination of women to men is socially
institutionalized .... Tihe group women.can be seen to have a collective social history of
disempowerment, exploitation and subordination extending to the present." Id.
41. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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intrafamily abuse situations. Support for mandatory arrest statutes
excludes Black women because these statutes conflict with the goals
of eradicating racism and violence against women. Women demand
protection from a male-controlled patriarchal state; and as this
demand is met, it appears as if "women" are gaining equality. Black
women, however, do not have the same access to the protections of
the state, and, in fact, are often themselves the victims of zealous
police and prosecutors.'
C. Intersection of Race and Gender in Mandatory Arrest Statutes
At least forty-eight states and the District of Columbia authorize
or require the police to make warrantless arrests, when there is
probable cause, in misdemeanor domestic violence incidents."
Mandatory arrest statutes, however, require the police to arrest if
there is probable cause that a family violence crime was committed."
42. See Wriggins, supra note 30, at 121-22 (discussing how the criminal justice sys-
tem-judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials-views the rape of Black women less
seriously than the rape of white women); Roberts, infta note 71 (finding that prosecutors are
more likely to bring charges against Black, drug-addicted mothers than similarly situated white
women).
43. See The Law Enforcement Training Project of the Victim Services Agency of New York
City, State Legislation Providingfor Law Enforcement Response to Family 1ioence, 12 RESPONSE TO THE
VI-rIMIZATIoN OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 6, 6 (1989) [hereinafter Law Enforcement Training
Project] (explaining that many of these jurisdictions require "some additional qualifier" to be
present before the police may make a warrantless arrest in a misdemeanor family violence case).
For states that authorize discretionary warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause to
believe that physical abuse has occurred, see, eg., HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (1985 & Supp.
1993); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 750 pam. 60-301(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 236.12.2(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874(1) (Callaghan 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODEANN. § 99-3-7(3) (1973); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.085(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9 (1990); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-21 (b) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-7(B) (5) (1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-11(1)(b) (1981 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Anderson
1993); WYO. STAT. § 7-20-102(a) (1993).
For states that authorize discretionary warrantiess arrest when the officer has probable cause
to believe that a civil protection order has been violated, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750 para.
60301 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MD. [FAMILY LAW] CODE ANN. § 4-509(b) (Supp. 1993); MiSs. CODE
ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-11 (1) (a) (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 7-20-
102(b) (1993).
The state of Tennessee requires that the officer see the violence, or that the officer have
probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred and that the fear of continued violence
is present. In addition, both the plaintiff and the defendant must be present when the officer
arrives. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-103(7) (A) (ii) (1990 & Supp. 1993).
44. At least twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes stipulating
mandatory warrantless arrests in domestic violence situations. Under these statutes, there are
five circumstances that are grounds for such arrests: (1) when there is probable cause to believe
violence has occurred or is likely to occur, (2) when there is probable cause to believe a
protection order has been violated; (3) when a violation of a protection order occurs in the
officer's presence; (4) when there is probable cause of aggravated battery, and/or (5) when the
officer observes a physical injury. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-104 (1987 & Supp. 1993) (stating
that arrest is mandatory when the officer has probable cause to believe that there is a protection
order violation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West 1993) (requiring arrest when the
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Some jurisdictions mandate dual arrest if there is probable cause to
believe that the woman attacked her partner.' Therefore, even if
the man is the principal perpetrator, the woman may also be at risk
of arrest if she injures him in self-defense. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the injustice of this result. The state of Washington, for
example, amended its statute in 1985 "so that mandatory arrest
applied only to the primary physical aggressor."'
officer, using speedy information, determines a crime of family violence has occurred); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a) (1) (Supp. 1993) (mandating arrest when the officer has probable cause
to believe that violence occurred); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403-760(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1992)
(stating that arrest is mandatory when the officer has probable cause to believe that there is a
protection order violation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (West 1993) (mandating that the
officer use all reasonable means, including arrest, when there is reason to believe a fami-
ly/household member has been abused and when there is probable cause of aggravated battery);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1993) (requiring that an arrest be
made based on probable cause that domestic violence has occurred); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A,
§ 6 (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1992) (stating that the officer shall arrest when there is reason
to believe a family member has been or is likely to be abused and that an officer shall arrest if
there is reason to believe a protection order has been violated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14-
(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (providing that an arrest shall be made if probable cause exists
that a protection order has been violated); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (Vernon's 1993)
(requiring that the officer arrest if there is an act of abuse in violation of a protective order);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (1992) (requiring an arrest based on a violation of a protection order);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.070(1) (Michie 1992) (requiring that the officer arrest if a violation of a
protective order takes place in the presence of the officer); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-21 (a) (1)-(3)
(West 1993) (requiring that an arrest be made if there is probable cause to believe that there
is physical injury, a violation of a protection order, or an arrest warrant); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
13-6(c) (Michie 1993) (stating that ifa protection order has been violated, the officer shall make
an arrest); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1989) (providing that an arrest shall be made when
there is probable cause to believe that a protection order violation has occurred); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (requiring that an arrest be made when an
officer observes a recent physical injury); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (a)-(c) (1991) (providing
that an arrest be made when there is probable cause a protection order has been violated); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113(a) (1991) (stating that the officer shall make an arrest when there
is probable cause to believe that there is a protection order violation); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-3-2.1 (2) (1993) (providing that an arrest shall be made if the officer has probable cause
to believe that violence has occurred and/or if the officer has probable cause to believe that a
protection order has been violated); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (2) (1991) (stating that the
officer shall make an arrest if there is reasonable cause to believe that there is a protection
order violation); TEX. [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that the
officer arrest ifa violation of a protective order takes place in the presence of the officer); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 30-6-8, 77-36-2 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (stating respectively that all reasonable means
shall be used, including arrest, if there is probable cause that a violation of a protection order
has occurred and/or there is probable cause that violence has occurred); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.31.100(2) (a)-(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (requiring that an arrest be made if probable
cause exists that violence has occurred and/or that a protection order has been violated and/or
if the officer observes a recent physical injury); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 813.125(6) (b), 813.12(7) (b),
968.075 (West 1993) (stating respectively that an arrest shall be made where there is probable
cause to believe that there is a protection order violation and/or there is reasonable grounds
to believe that violence has occurred or is likely to occur and/or the officer observes a recent
physical injury).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (the police officer "shall arrest the person or persons
suspected of [committing a family violence crime] and charge such person or persons with
appropriate crime").
46. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1990); see also, Law Enforcement
Training Project, supra note 43, at 9 ("The determination of the primary physical aggressor is
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Mandatory arrest statutes implicate gender inequality precisely
because of the fact that the vast majority of primary aggressors of
domestic violence are men.47  Racial oppression is also implicated
because even though the statutes mandate arrest, which theoretically
should remove the possibility of a racist application of the law by the
police, the police must still determine if "probable cause" exists."
In the absence of obvious physical injuries, this leaves some discretion
to the police. Because the initial threshold of probable cause must
still be determined, the danger remains that the police will arrest
Black perpetrators at a greater rate than white perpetrators.49
The fact that mostly white women advocate for mandatory arrest
laws highlights the different ways in which white and Black women
may perceive the role that the criminal justice system should play in
alleviating domestic violence."0 White women often incorrectly
assume that Black women will identify first with other women, rather
than with their race, and support laws which purport to better the
treatment of women.51 Susan Schechter quotes a minority woman
who asserted that "[m ] ost third world women identify with their race
first."5 2  White women also identify with their own race, in other
words, with white men, before they identify with Black women.
Patricia Hill Collins describes the historical basis for this group
identification, contending that although "united by biological sex,
women do not form the same type of group as do African-Americans,
Jews, Native Americans, Vietnamese, or other groups with distinct
histories, geographic origins, cultures, and social institutions.""3
not based on who hit first, but takes into account the relative severity of the parties' injuries.").
47. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 540 (rebutting some earlier theorists' assertions that
women batter as much as men, and asserting that violence is "overwhelmingly" directed against
women).
48. See supra note 44.
49. See BELL, supra note 9, at 340 (reviewing racially discriminatory practices in law
enforcement which demonstrate that Blacks are more likely to be arrested or convicted than
whites for the same crime).
50. seeSCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 120, 271-81 (discussing the difficulty of opening up the
battered women's movement to minority women). Schechter notes that the battered women's
shelters were run by predominantly white women, and that "women of color" were reluctant to
visit many of these shelters because of the "white middle class bias of most battered women's
programs." Id. at 272. See also Schneider, supra note 7, at 532 (noting that, until recently, the
battered women's movement was "largely shaped by the experiences and understanding ofwhite
women").
51. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1470-71 (advocating that Black women exclude white women
"from their associations when necessary to heal or gain empowerment").
52. SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 275 (quoting Renae Scott's statement during an
interview). In her book WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE, Schechter does not distinguish between
Black women and women from third world countries, but rather uses the phrases "black
women," "third world women," and "women of color" interchangeably. Id. at 120, 271-81.
53. PATRICIA HILL CoLINs, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
THE POLrTICS OF EMPOWERMENT 27 (1991).
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FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY ARREST
While women do indeed share similar experiences, these are not the
same, historically, as the experiences that racial and ethnic groups
share.54
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLiC: AN ANALYSIS OF RACE
AND GENDER
An analysis of race and gender in the context of domestic violence
reveals that for white women, gender is the principal source of
oppression, while for Black women, race is the principal source of
oppression.5 Black feminists have challenged the notion that Black
women can separate or prioritize their concurrent oppressions,
56
recognizing that the situation of Black women in America is far more
complex than is suggested by a layering of oppressions in any
particular order. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the sources
and relative importance of oppression in order to better understand
the relationship between Black women and white women.
Domestic violence policy is a good vehicle for the consideration of
the hierarchical complexities of race and gender, because it goes to
the heart of questions about state intervention and the criminal
justice system. Mandatory arrest laws must be examined because they
are a solution to which many domestic violence advocates are eagerly
turning.' 7 Arresting batterers, however, is a poor strategy for
curtailing domestic violence. At the same time, there is conflicting
evidence on the efficacy of deterring violence."8 Not only will
mandatory arrest statutes increase incarceration rates for Blacks and
54. Id. 27-28; see also, supranotes 14-27 (discussing the historical conflicts between Black and
white women).
55. This assertion does not ignore the sexist oppression that Black women suffer, but rather
acknowledges that issues of race and gender cannot be so easily separated for Black women.
See Smith, supra note 8, at 1484 (noting that Black women are doubly burdened because they
"face racism and sexism simultaneously").
56. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Citique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Themy, and Antiracist Politics [1989, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER57, 57 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy
eds., 1990) (arguing that Black women are "multiply-burdened" and cannot be relegated to a
mere subset of either Blacks or women); COLUINS, supra note 53, at 222 (explaining that Black
feminist thought views the distinctive systems of oppression, such as those based on race, sexual
orientation, and class as part of "one overarching structure of domination"). In a recent
interview, Surgeon General of the United States Dr. M. Joycelyn Elders was asked whether "she
felt more oppressed as a woman than as a black." In response, Dr. Elders stated: "No. I feel
that I am who I am because I'm a black female." Claudia DreifusJoycelyn Elders Toughs It Ou N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 16, 18 (second emphasis added).
57. See RHODE, supra note 28, at 242-43 (discussing mandatory arrest as an effective option);
Wright, supra note 3, at 249.
58. See infra part VI and accompanying text.
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contribute to the continued oppression of Black men, 9 but arrest as
a strategy fails to address the patriarchal justification for state
intervention. In fact, increased state controls over family relations,
however abusive or oppressive, strengthen the patriarchy from which
feminists struggle to free themselves.
Domestic violence, also called wife battering or wife abuse, has been
an accepted practice for centuries.' Domestic violence includes
physical and sexual abuse, as well as psychological torture."' It
typically takes the form of men beating their partners; however, there
are cases of women instigating abuse against their partners as well as
abusing their partners in self-defense.62 The first reported case of
a woman who took her husband to court for domestic violence is
Neffeld v. Neffeld, a fourteenth-century, English case. In that case,
a woman appealed to the court for justice and was denied relief."
Instead, she was sent back to her husband to endure a marriage filled
with beatings.' While there are no comprehensive statistics on the
multitude of domestic violence incidents, there is general agreement
59. See Debra L. Dailey, Prison and Race in Minnesota, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 761 (1993)
(noting that the United States incarcerates "African-American males at four times the rate of
South Africa"); see generally Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations
Reisite 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743 (1993) (stating that although the proportion of Black to
white persons in prison varies widely from state to state, the "aggregate disproportionality," or
national average ratio, is seven Black persons to one white person in prison).
60. For a concise history of domestic violence, see RHODE, supra note 28, at 237 (declaring
that women have been battered for centuries, but only in recent decades has this become a
public concern). See also, SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 29-30 (claiming that the women's
movement was a response by activists in the early 1970s to the systematic abuse of women in
society).
61. There are many accounts of the horrors of being abused. See THE NEv OUR BODIES
OURSELVES, UPDATED AND EXPANDED FOR THE '90s 137 (1992) [hereinafter THE NEV OUR
BODIES, OURSELVES] ("I have had glasses thrown at me .... I have been whipped, kicked and
thrown, picked up and thrown down again ... I have been slapped for saying something about
politics, having a different view about religion .... ").
62. I do not focus on the latter here, simply because the vast majority of the cases are man-
on-woman violence. A study by The Bureau ofJustice Statistics indicates that approximately 95%
of all domestic violence victims are women. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (1983). One author examines the question of how to label
violence against women, noting:
On the one hand, 'wife abuse' or 'wife beating' are undeniably more accurate but such
terms are not empowering for women as they underscore the idea of woman as eternal
victim. On the other hand, 'spousal abuse' suggests a non-existent neutrality, although
the term 'domestic violence' itself disguises which sex is responsible for the
preponderance of the battering.
Margaret Thornton, Feminism and the Contradictions of Law Reform, 19 INT'LJ. SOC. L 453, 460
(1991) (citation omitted).
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that millions of American women are beaten annually.' Another
often cited statistic is that a woman is beaten in her home every
eighteen seconds.67 It is now accepted that women of all classes and
races are abused, and that men of all races and classes batter.'
There is no stereotypical victim or perpetrator of domestic violence.
The women and families who experience intrafamily violence come
from a variety of racial and socio-economic groups.69
The private sphere of the traditional family structure has allowed
men to batter without fear of state intervention, based on the theories
that domestic violence is a family matter and that victims of domestic
violence provoke the battering incident." The conceptualization of
privacy, however, and its implications for women in the family, are
different for Black women than for white women, because the
potential for state intervention and governmental coercion into the
private sphere of the family is of greater concern for Black women
than for white women.71 An article examining the consequences of
arrest programs in Britain makes an important point about govern-
mental intrusion into Black and immigrant women's lives. The
authors suggest that:
[w] omen may perceive public control as even more dangerous than
private, since it may entail surveillance, not only by the criminal
justice system, but by other state agencies as well, for example,
those dealing with immigration and child welfare which have the
power to deport and remove children, respectively. This is a civil
66. See RHODE, supra note 28, at 237 (estimating that 10 to 20 percent of American women
are beaten by an intimate male partner annually); supra note 7 (citing statistics on domestic
violence in the United States).
67. Note, The Demise of Ozzie and Harriet: Effective Punishment of Domestic Abusers, 17 CRIM. &
CIv. CO INEMENT 337, 338 (1991) [hereinafter Note] (citing GENDER BIAs STUDYOFTHE COURT
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETrIS, GENDER BIAs COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETrS
79 (1989)).
68. SeeTHE NEw OUR BODIES, OURSELVES, supra note 61, at 137 (acknowledging thatwomen
from all socio-economic backgrounds are battered by men of all walks of life); Note, supra note
67, at 340 ("Wife beating knows no socio-economic boundaries.").
69. See DeeanaJang, Debbie Lee, & Rachel Morello-Frosch, Domestic VIolence in the Immigrant
and Refugee Community: Responding to the Needs of Immigrant Women, 13 RESPONSE 2, 3 (1990)
("Violence transcends cultural lines, yet it is not considered 'the norm' in any one communi-
ty."). Id. at 3.
70. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 1502-03.
71. See Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Ro Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1470 & n.251 (1991) (stating that the
government's intrusive presence in Black women's lives is testimony to the privacy critique's
shortcomings asserted by some white feminist scholars). "Feminist legal theory focuses on the
private realm of the family as an institution of violence and subordination. Women of color,
however, often experience the family as the site of solace and resistance against racial
oppression." Id. at 1470-71. Roberts notes that the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers and
coerced sterilization are examples of government power that pose a much greater threat to
Black women than to white women. Id. at 1471.
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liberties issue of particular significance for poor, working class and
ethnic minority women, since state surveillance is more likely to be
forced upon them than upon their middle-class and/or white
sisters.72
The very conceptualization of the family, and its potential benefits
and harms, is different for white and Black women.'3 For Black
women, the family provides protection and solace from the state,
while white women do not need such solace because they are not
subject to the same governmental coercion.74 In the context of
mandatory arrest laws, governmental intervention into Black family
homes has grave consequences for Black women, resulting in the
removal of their partners, who are often a source of income and
support for the family.
Although men of all classes and races batter, only men who are
poor and Black are routinely punished for it because the criminal
justice system generally targets minority men for punishment."
Some critics of mandatory arrest laws argue that these laws do not
serve the needs and wishes of many battered women anyway because
they fail to accommodate the economic or domestic concerns of the
victim. 6  While the goal of the criminal system is to arrest and
72. Rebecca Morley & Audrey Mullender, Hype or Hope? The Importation of Pro-Arrest Policies
and Batterers'Programmes from North America to Britain as Key Measures for Preventing rolence Against
Women in the Home, 6 INT'LJ.L. & FAM. 265, 272 (1992); see alsoJang, Lee & Morello-Frosch,
supra note 69, at 5 (stating that most immigrant and refugee women hesitate to go to the police
out of a well-founded fear that they or their partners will be deported).
73. Roberts, supra note 71, at 1470 & n.254.
74. See Roberts, supra note 71, at 1470-71 (arguing that the family can be a source of
strength and place of refuge for Black women who are faced with government interference in
areas such as reproductive rights and child custody). Poor white women are also subject to
more governmental intrusions than middle- and upperclass white women. See Elisabeth
Schillinger, Dependency, Control and Isolation:Battered Women and the Welfare System, 16J. CONTEMP.
ETHNOGR at Y469, 476 (1988) (reporting that in a study of eleven white women on welfare who
had left their battering spouses, all eleven women traded abusive homes for the protection of
the state in the form of welfare). Schillinger further notes that the government control to which
these poor white women were subjected included "such aspects of the women's lives such asjob
referrals, living arrangements, child care, and job-training programs." Id. at 478.
75. See Dailey, supra note 59, at 766 (illustrating that Black men are arrested and convicted
for violent crimes, including domestic violence, 10% more than white men); see also Daly, supra
note 6, at 12 (concluding that "the state's power to accuse and punish wrongdoing is
disproportionately visited on economically marginalized and ethnic minority men and women");
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CIUMINALJUSTICE-1991 (TimothyJ. Flanagan
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991) (noting that 30.3% of those arrested in 1990 for "offenses
against family and children" were Black, while 65.7% were white). In 1990, Blacks between the
ages of 18-44 made up only 12.4% of the total population, while whites made up 79.0%. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992 (112th ed. 1992).
Consequently, Blacks were arrested at rates far greater than their relative proportional
representation in the total population.
76. SeeWright, supra note 3, at 243 (examining the feasibility of mandatory arrest policies
around the country). The author suggests that mandatory arrest policies "ignore the role of the
victim's values and disregard her perceptions of the problem." Id. at 261.
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prosecute, the battered woman seeking immediate relief may not
necessarily wish to send her abuser to prison because she may rely on
her abuser for financial support or fear retribution.
7
7
IV. ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF BAT=ERED WOMEN
A. State Responses to Domestic Vwlence
Until recently, the federal, state, and local governments failed to
protect women from violence suffered at the hands of their husbands
or boyfriends. 8 Many formal laws and informal codes of behavior
reinforced the male privilege to beat their wives without punish-
ment.79  The patriarchal state made it both easy and acceptable to
practice domestic violence because the oppressors controlled the
legislature and the judicial system. American courts have only
recently started to consider seriously both civil and criminal remedies
against abusive husbands and boyfriends."
The connection between rape and domestic violence is important
when analyzing state responses to violence against women because it
demonstrates how the law treats Black and white women differently.
Rape has traditionally been considered a violent act that is usually
perpetrated by a stranger. In fact, rape, as well as domestic violence,
77. I encountered this response from numerous women when I volunteered as a criminal
victim's advocate at the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence in the District of Columbia.
Many women are simply ambivalent about their relationship with the batterer, and are unwilling
to follow through with judicial proceedings. Often times the battered woman is scared to press
charges for fear of retaliation in the form of more violence. See Legal Responses to Domestic
V1olenc?, supra note 1, at 1540. Although this may be true in some situations, the woman's
decision not to press charges must still be respected, especially where she is making as informed
a choice as possible based upon her economic and social needs.
78. See Note, supra note 67, at 339 (observing that the judicial system has historically
ignored the problem of domestic violence because the family has been viewed by society as a
refuge from the problems of the world); Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5
WOMEN'S RTs. REP. 7, 9 (1978) (chastising the police and court officials for treating violence as
a "private privilege of marriage which does now [sic] warrant state interference because women
are viewed as their husbands' property.").
79. See Note, supra note 67, at 338 (citing the criminal justice system's refusal to respond
to domestic violence as the equivalent of silent approval for men to beat their partners). The
"rule of thumb" is the most commonly cited example of such a law. Id. This rule allowed a
husband to beat his wife, as long as the stick with which he beat her was no thicker than his
thumb. Id.
80. While I do not develop the point in this paper, it is worth noting that there have also
been successful civil suits filed against police departments for failure to intervene in a domestic
abuse situation when the woman repeatedly requested police protection. See Thurman v. City
of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that the Torrington Police
Department could be sued for failing to restrain plaintiff's husband from viciously attacking her
in the presence of police officers); see also Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic
VIolence 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53-60 (1992) (noting that police
departments are providing sensitivity training on domestic violence to officers as a result of law
suits brought against law enforcement officers who fail to protect domestic violence victims).
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is most often perpetrated by someone whom the victim knows.81
The historical social separation of whites and Blacks facilitated white
women's ability to falsely accuse Black men of raping them. While all
women who were subjected to domestic violence were without
recourse to the state, white women were protected in cases of stranger
rape, especially if the accused rapist was Black. 2 Insidious myths
about the sexual promiscuity of Black women, however, meant that
they could not be raped. 3
The oppression that white women experience within a violent
relationship is principally gender oppression because the vast majority
of intimate relationships are interracial." Moreover, when white
women accuse the state of complicity in its system of oppression that
condones battering, it is the male state that is at issue."5 For Black
women oppressed by both domestic violence and governmental
intrusions into their lives, it is the white, male state that is their primary
oppressor.
6
The campaign for mandatory arrest laws benefits white women
without the same negative consequences that affect Black women and
men."' Consequently, because state intervention operates primarily
81. See Most Female Crime Victims Knew Attackers, Study Finds, WASH. POST,Jan. 31, 1994, at A5
[hereinafter Most Female Crime Vtdims] ("Two-thirds of attacks against women are committed by
someone they know....").
82. SeeANGELAY. DAVIS, WOMEN, CULTURE, & POLrICs 44 (1989) (stating that the double
standard of the court system in prosecuting Black men more severely than white men made
Black women more reluctant to join the movement against domestic violence). "If, throughout
our history in this country the rape of Black women by white men has constituted a political
weapon of terror, then the flip side of the coin has been the frame-up rape charge directed at
Black men. Thousands of terroristic lynchings have been justified by the myth of the Black
rapist." Id.
83. See Nell Irvin Painter, HiU, Thomas, and the Use of Racial Stereope, in RACE-INGJUSTICE,
EN-GENDERING PoWE: ESSAYS ON ANTA HIL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALIy, (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (stating that the Jezebel image of the Black woman,
meaning that "black women are always ready for sex and, as a consequence, cannot be raped"
still persists); see also Cassia Spohn &Jerry Cederblom, Race and Disparities in Sentencing: A Test
of the Liberation HypothesisJusniCE QUARTERLY 305, 322 (1991) (observing that research in 1989
indicated that rape cases where the offender is Black and the victim is white are treated more
harshly than other configurations, especially where both the offender and the victim are Black).
84. In 1992,50,873 million of the 53,512 million married couples were "same race couples."
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993 54 (113th ed.
1993).
85. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-62
(theorizing that the "state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way
men see and treat women.").
86. See Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 77 n.46 (suggesting that universalizing the white
woman's experience of oppression conceals the fact that Black and other minority men are not
part of the public system of domination, and may themselves be victimized by it). Crenshaw
further states that "[efforts to think more clearly about when Black women are dominated as
women and when they are dominated as Black women are directly related to the question of when
power is male and when it is white male." Id.
87. See supra notes 57-59, 73-75 and accompanying text.
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to the benefit of white women, feminists need to consider more
carefully the implications of racism within the criminal justice system
when searching for solutions to domestic violence.' Battered
women who kill their abusers also receive different treatment of their
defenses based on their race. Black women have met with less success
than white women in asserting the battered woman syndrome
defense. 9 The battered woman syndrome is constructed so that the
woman defendant must appear weak and helpless in order for ajury
to acquit her of a murder charge.°" Sharon Allard suggests that
Black women are not generally viewed as weak, and therefore, the
construction of the defense excludes Black women.91
Not only does the state address domestic violence from a dominant,
white perspective, thereby excluding any analysis of race, but so does
the battered women's movement." Women who turn to the courts
and police for protection are complying with a patriarchal system
which often still allows men to batter their wives with little or no
consequence.93 Even where courts and legislatures are responding
to the problem of domestic violence, 4 white women primarily benefit.
B. Responses to Battering by Battered Women's Advocates
It is now commonly recognized that Black women have been
excluded from feminist debates and campaigns about domestic
88. See DAVIS, supra note 82, at 50 (asserting that we who are "militant activists challenging
violence against women, we must also fulfill our duties as fearless fighters against police violence,
and we must express our passionate solidarity with the racially and nationally oppressed people
who are its main targets.").
89. Battered woman syndrome may sometimes be offered at trial to show that the
defendant, a woman accused of murdering her abuser, experienced a history of battering, and
therefore demonstrates a reasonable fear for her life which would allow a self-defense theory.
LENORE WALKER, TERRIPING LOVE: WHY BATrERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS,
201, 209-10 (explaining how the myths concerning Black women's sexuality and strong image
weaken their assertion of a "battered woman" syndrome defense for victims who murder their
abusers).
90. Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective
1 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 191, 193-94 (1991). Allard notes that the battered woman syndrome
"relies on prevailing gender characterizations of dominant, white society." Id. at 195.
91. Id. at 197 (stating that the image of white women as helpless, fragile and non-aggressive
allows them to successfully use the battered woman syndrome defense, whereas the image of
Black women as strong and angry excludes them from the same defense).
92. Id. at 197-98.
93. See RHODE, supra note 28, at 241 (noting that manyjudges' attitudes regarding domestic
violence have not changed, thus reinforcing the public/private distinction discussed supra notes
71-75).
94. One way in which courts and legislatures have responded is by recognizing the validity
of the battered woman syndrome defense. RHODE, supra note 28, at 241. See generally, Legal
Responses to Domestic VIolence, supra note 1, at 1530-47 (discussing the development of judicial
responses such as tort actions, stalking statutes, arrest policies, and prosecution policies to
domestic violence).
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violence.95 Likewise, Black women have not always embraced the
struggles of the women's movement because they were working with
Black fnen to fight "more oppressive beasts like hate crimes and legal
segregation."" Several accounts of the battered women's movement
address the exclusion of Black women's voices and experiences from
this movement. 7
Advocates of mandatory arrest argue that once the abuser is in
custody, the battered woman will have an opportunity to pursue
whatever options she may have in order to extricate herself from the
battering situation.98 These options include obtaining civil protec-
tion orders,99 finding a battered women's shelter,"° or staying with
family. Advocates of mandatory arrest also support swift and vigorous
prosecution of domestic violence cases, believing that this will send a
message to society that domestic violence will no longer be tolerat-
ed."'1 Some advocates seek a "no-drop" policy from the prosecutor's
office. Such a policy provides that once charges have been brought
against the batterer, the case will not be dropped, even if the
complaining witness changes her mind about testifying for the
state." 2 The implications of these arguments should be apparent
to feminists: the victim is stripped of control and decision-making with
respect to the criminal case. This is yet another example of the
patriarchal protection of the legal system."0 3
95. See Poe, supra note 20, at CI (asserting that white women created the word feminism
from a white perspective). White women's interpretation of feminism tends to exclude Black
women because white women's view of feminism does not always recognize that Black women
are discriminated against based on both their race and sex. Id.
96. Poe, supra note 20, at C1.
97. See, SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 275 (describing the exclusion's effect on Black and
minority communities); Allard, supra, note 90 (finding that Black women were excluded from
the battered woman syndrome defense).
98. SeeLegal Responses toDomestic I'wlence, supra note 1, at 1506-27 (presenting the advantages
and disadvantages of the traditional devices of shelters and civil protection orders and suggesting
the need for a combination of these mechanisms along with state and federal support). A
woman's socio-economic class may determine what type of help she seeks. Middle- or upper-
income victims are "better able to shield their abuse by going to private hospitals or a relative's
home rather than seeking help from a battered women's shelter." Note, supra note 67, at 340.
99. Legal Responses to Domestic Vwlenc supra note 1, at 1509-11.
100. Legal Responses to Domestic Viwlenc supra note 1, at 1506-07.
101. Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 1513.
102. Legal Responses to Domestic Vwlnce, supra note 1, at 1540.
103. But see Sarah Mausolff Buel, Mandatoy ArrestforDomestic Violence, I I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
213, 223-24 (1988) (arguing that officer-initiated arrest actually empowers the victim by
reinforcing the idea that society values her and her needs).
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF MANDATORY ARREST
V. MANDATORY ARREST FAILS TO DETER REPEAT VIOLENCE
Mandatory arrest policies will not eliminate a deeply-rooted societal
problem such as domestic violence. °4 Even battered women's
advocates have been bitterly divided about whether to provide
treatment for batterers or simply seek criminal punishment. °"
Consequently, there is a division among advocates as to the best
method for solving the social problem of domestic violence:
Within the domestic violence community, there are two distinct
schools of thought concerning the proper prioritization among
substantive responses to domestic violence. One school advocates
"control" strategies, which would punish and restrain assailants; the
other favors a more community-based (for the victim, focusing on
shelter and assistance) and treatment-oriented (for the victim and
assailant) approach. 6
If the goal is simply punishment, then mandatory arrest is sensible,
because widespread arrest of abusers temporarily punishes them for
their abusive behavior.0 7 If, on the other hand, the goal is the
104. Statistics and reports on the efficacy of mandatory arrest laws in eliminating domestic
violence are very erratic. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE:
EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 14 (1992) (admitting that "while [domestic violence] reports are
going up, the actual number ofincidents may be going down-or up, or remaining unchanged.
The question has not yet been investigated by empirical research." (emphasis added)). In NewJersey,
a reported decrease in domestic violence was due to missing statistics, rather than an actual
decrease in these crimes. Police Say Clerk Hid Abuse Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at 53
(reporting that a clerk hid 4,630 domestic violence reports, which led to the false report that
domestic violence crimes decreased by 26% in the first half of 1993).
105. See David Adams, Treatment Models of Men Who Batter A Profeminist Analysis, in FEMINIsT
PEPETVES ON WIFE ABUSE 176 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (analyzing five
different treatment models and recommending profeminist treatment for batterers). The pro-
feminist model provides a broader definition of violence, which is "any act that causes the victim
to do something she does not want to do, prevents her from doing something she wants to do,
or causes her to be afraid." Id. at 191-196, This definition includes physical and psychological
abuse. Its analytic function focuses on the controlling effects on behavior. Treatment,
therefore, concentrates on identification and elimination of violent and controlling behaviors
as well as on sexist expectations and attitudes. Id. But see Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization
of Domestic Volence, 83J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 220 (1992) (arguing that both civil and
criminal intervention are necessary, and further stating that "mediation [or treatment options]
ignores the criminality of the abuser's behavior").
106. Legal Responses to Domestic Vllence, supra note 1, at 1521.
107. If criminal charges are filed after the arrest, the process involves arraignments, pretrial
hearings, plea negotiations, continuances, and eventually trial. Wright, supra note 3, at 255.
The defendant is rarely held in jail pending his trial unless he has committed or commits
another serious offense. During their study on the effect of arrest on domestic violence in
Minneapolis, Sherman and Berk discovered that
of those [batterers] arrested, 43 percentwere released within one day, 86 percentwere
released within one week, and only 14 percent were released after one week or had not
yet been released at the time of the initial interview. Clearly, there was very little
incapacitation, especially in the context of the six-month follow-up. Indeed, virtually
all those arrested were released before the first follow-up interview.
Sherman & Berk, infra note 111, at 268.
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eradication of domestic violence and its causes, then criminal
sanctions provide only a brief hiatus, because unless the general
sexual domination of women by men is addressed and eradicated, the
violence will recur."8
Not only does mandatory arrest perpetuate the racist patriarchal
nature of the criminal justice system, but it also fails to meet its own
stated goal of deterrence. Advocates for mandatory arrest claim that
arresting the batterer sends a strong message to both him and society
that violence will not be tolerated, and therefore, mandatory arrest
will deter further domestic violence."° Battered women's advocates,
however, called for police intervention in domestic violence well
before any studies were completed to determine whether or not an
arrest policy would reduce future violence. 10
The seminal study of the impact of arrest on recidivism in domestic
violence cases was conducted in Minneapolis."' The Minneapolis
108. SeeWright, supra note 3, at 255 ("Our present criminal system has not been particularly
successful in accomplishing objectives applicable to domestic violence, such as deterrence,
prevention, or rehabilitation."); see also Gary Paquin, Social Support as Protection: Reactions to
Neighbor's Domestic Quarrels and Violence, 20 FREE INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SOC. 171, 176 (1992)
(showing that in a study conducted in Alameda County, California, "respondents who contacted
the police felt satisfied that the police handled the matter well in the short-run, but emphasized
the recuring nature of the violence." (emphasis added)). The criminal process is not the best
system for solving the social problem of domestic violence for several reasons:
The components of the criminaljustice model-arrest, arraignment, the release on
bond or recognizance, trial, jail-best fit those crimes against person or property in
which "rational" or "economic" factors predominantly motivate the offenders. The
justifications for the criminal process become steadily weaker as the problems with
which it must deal become more personal, more emotional, and more intense.
Martha H. Field & Henry F. Field, Marital Violence and the Criminal Process: NeitherJustice NorPeace,
47 Soc. SERV. REV. 221, 227 (1973).
109. Wright, supra note 3, at 253. Wright acknowledges ,that there are potential problems
with a mandatory arrest policy because such a policy views domestic violence as a crime and not
as a complex social problem. Id. at 254-59.
110. SeeWoods, supra note 78, at 7-8 (criticizing the law enforcement agencies in general for
not arresting domestic abusers and emphasizing the inappropriateness of that response); see also
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE CRIME FILE STUDY GUIDE: DOMESTIc
VIOLENCE (noting that historically, arresting domestic assailants was based on retributive beliefs
because of the seriousness of the crime and the moral appropriateness of the response of
prosecution and punishment). Sherman also notes that "[t]he call for more reliance on arrest
policies was not seen as a means of deterring repeat violence or as a means of deterring other
potential offenders." Id.
111. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The SpecyficDeterrent Effects ofArrestforDomestic
Assault, 49 AMER. Soc. REV. 261 (1984). Sherman and Berk's study only applied to misdemeanor
"domestic assaults, where both the suspect and the victim were present when the police arrived."
Id. at 263. The National Institute of Justice commissioned six studies to replicate the
Minneapolis study. The results have been published from the Omaha, Charlotte, Milwaukee,
Metro-Dade (Miami), and Colorado Springs studies. Milwaukee, Omaha, and Charlotte found
an increase in violence after arrest, and Colorado Springs showed some deterrent effect, but this
was based only on victim reports. SHERMAN, supra note 104, at Appendices 1 & 2, 269-382.
Victim reports are problematic because they are often unreliable. If the reports are in the form
of phone calls, the abuser may be in the room at the time and control the woman's ability to
speak freely. Id. The woman might also fear that the abuser would open and screen her
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study randomly assigned one of three different methods of addressing
family abuse to the police assigned to respond to domestic violence
calls." 2 The assigned methods included mediation, temporary
separation, and arrest n ' The abuse recidivism rate was then
assessed after six months."
4
The study was not designed to test for a general deterrent effect,
but rather was designed to test a specific deterrent effect. In other
words, the abuser must batter the same victim within six months of
the first reported incident in order for it to be counted as recidivist
behavior.' Testing for specific deterrents within a six-month
period ignores the realities of the dynamics of domestic violence,
including the fact that in long-term abusive relationships there is
often a pattern of long calm periods in between violent episodes.1
6
Furthermore, this approach could not account for whether the man
would abuse other women in subsequent relationships.
Although the Minneapolis study found that the women reported
fewer repeat incidents after their abusers were arrested, the authors
never recommended mandatory arrest as a solution to the problem
of domestic abuse. Rather, they suggested that a pro-arrest presump-
tion appeared to be supported by the evidence produced in the
investigation."' One author of the study, however, made clear that
additional studies needed to be conducted in order to substantiate
the applicability of the Minneapolis results and whether or not
mandatory arrest laws were the appropriate remedy for domestic
violence."8
The Minneapolis experiment was widely publicized in the media
and academic journals,"9 whereas the "equally valid and compel-
ling" results of the Omaha study, which showed an increase in
outgoing (and incoming) mail. IK
112. Sherman & Berk, supra note 111, at 263.
113. Sherman & Berk, supra note 111, at 263.
114. Sherman & Berk, supra note 111, at 263.
115. Sherman & Berk, supra note 111, at 263.
116. SHERMAN, supra note 104, at Appendix 1, 276. Lenore Walker, an expert on battered
woman syndrome, found that battering occurred in "repeated cycles," each consisting of three
phases:
The first phase is a period of tension-building which leads up to phase two, or the
acute battering incident. The third phase consists of kind, loving, contrite behavior
displayed by the batterer toward the woman, which provides the reinforcement for the
cycles.
LENoRE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 2 (1984). This cyclical pattern of
alternating violence and love allows the abuser to exercise a unique form of power and
manipulation over the battered woman.
117. Sherman & Berk, supra note 111, at 270.
118. SHERMAN, supra note 104, at 125-140.
119. SHERMfAN, supra note 104, at 20-21.
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violence after arrest, were published in a remote academic journal
and ignored by the media.120  Consequently, and perhaps most
importantly, a large number of police officers and women's advocacy
groups do not even know of the Omaha study or its results.'12  This
demonstrates that battered women's advocates made uninformed
decisions about the efficacy of mandatory arrest laws based, in part,
on a "law and order" theme of the criminal justice system.
More recent studies on the efficacy of arrest policies in deterring
domestic violence have concluded that arrest does not deter repeat
violence. 22  One such study determined that arrest has a different
impact on recidivism depending upon the employment status, marital
status," and residence of the people involved. 124  In cities with
large concentrations of Blacks, arrest did not deter, but rather,
increased the possibility of repeat attacks." This finding suggests
that the implementation of mandatory arrest policies placed Black
women at risk for further violence.126  Battered women's advocates
who support mandatory arrest programs need to address findings such
as these, and reassess arrest policies in light of data that suggests that
white and Black women are affected differently by mandatory arrest
laws.
120. SHERMAN, supra note 104, at 20-21.
121. See SHERMAN, supra note 104, at 20-21 (arguing that, as a result, the Omaha study had
little or no influence on domestic violence policy).
122. See, e.g.,J. David Hirschel, Ira W. Hutchison, & Charles W. Dean, The Failure of Arrest to
DeterSpouseAbuse, 29J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ, 7 (1992) (showing that arrest is no more effective
than temporary separation of the couple, or issuing a citation to the offender); Franklyn W.
Dunford, David Huizinga & Delbert S. Elliot, The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha
PoliceFxperiment 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990) (citing the results of the Omaha study to show that
arrest did not, by itself, deter subsequent battering); see alsoJoan McCord, Deterrence of Domestic
Volence: A Critical View of Research, 29J. RES. CRIME & DEuNQ. 229 (1992) (critiquing existing
research and offering new approaches to the study of domestic violence).
123. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Douglas A. Smith, Janell D. Schmidt & Dennis P. Rogan,
Crime, Punishment and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM.
Soc. REv. 680, 680 (1992) (finding that the effect of arrest on recidivism was not affected by
race, but arrest did increase recidivism when the batterer was unemployed and/or unmarried).
124. See SHERMAN, supra note 104, at 3 (emphasizing the difference between the cities where
arrest deters and where arrest does not deter: more Blacks live in the cities where arrest increases
the statistical chances of violence recurring, and more whites live in the cities where arrest
decreases the chances of further violence).
125. See SHERMAN, supra note 104, at 3 (listing Milwaukee, Charlotte and Omaha as
examples); see also Most Female Crime Victims, supra note 81, at A5 (stating that young Black
women living in inner cities are more likely to be raped or attacked than women in suburban
and rural areas).
126. Since the majority of married couples are same race couples, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 84, at 54, Black women are at a greater risk in areas with large concentra-
tions of Blacks.
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VI. A NEW VISION FOR A FEMINIST RESPONSE TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Due to the racist and sexist oppression of the criminal justice
system, as well as the evidence that arresting abusers may not deter
but can actually increase repeat violence, an alternative, community-
based model to the current system of governmental intervention into
domestic violence situations is necessary. This section envisions a
social reality where men do not beat women. Men and women
working to build a new construction of gender and race can advance
society to a point of less violence. A law and order approach will not
significantly reduce violence in the short-term, and will not eradicate
it in the long-term. Only a feminist, anti-racist, political struggle will
effect this new reality.
127
Susan Schechter analyzes the economic conditions in the United
States and shows how the private realm of the family, and thus female
subordination, relies on the capitalist private economy.1 28  She
questions whether certain material conditions, which she deems
necessary to end domestic violence, are possible under the capitalist
structure." These material conditions include jobs, shelter, free
health care for everyone, affordable decent housing, and child
care.' Schechter's vision may not seem very realistic in today's
society, but it merits consideration when discussing methods for
ending domestic violence that extend beyond criminal punishment of
the abuser.
The very construction of the family should expand to include
members of the community at large."' Such community-based
family would be accountable to the entire community for the health
and welfare of its members. This new familial structure provides a
way for abused women to look outside the narrow, patriarchal
construction of the traditional family unit and seek support from the
127. See SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 238 ("Since male supremacy is the historical source of
battering, and class domination perpetuates male privilege, a long-range plan to end abuse
includes a total restructuring of society that is feminist, anti-racist, and socialist.").
128. SCHctCrTER, supra note 11, at 238. In a capitalist society the value ofwomen's work does
not exist, and women themselves are degraded because the economic system makes them subject
to their husbands' whims and isolates them from other women. Id. "Patriarchy in the modem
capitalist welfare state is marked by an increased devaluation of motherhood that cuts across
racial lines." Roberts, suPra note 11, at 27.
129. SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 238.
130. SCHECITER, supra note 11, at 238.
131. SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 239 (expanding these forms would then encompass
homosexual families, single-women headed families, and non-nuclear families).
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community.112  Elimination of the separation between family and
community might encourage women to come out of isolation and
assert their right to live free from violence.
Domestic violence has its deep roots in the patriarchy, which is both
a racist and sexist system of white male domination. Consequently,
a family structure that includes the larger community, thereby
extending beyond the private realm of the traditional family structure,
would allow women to assert their independence from domination by
abusive husbands. The women could find material and emotional
support in the community; the community would also be responsible
for helping the abuser understand and stop his violent behavior.'
A system should be created from the understanding that domestic
violence is not an individual, private problem that some men have in
controlling their anger. It is, rather, a manifestation of a social
problem that is founded upon male control over women, and white
male control over social rules and institutions.
This model may be best structured by considering how other
cultures have dealt with domestic violence. One cross-cultural analysis
of wife battering observes that when women have significant economic
power outside the home, there is less battering in that society.1
34
While men of all classes and races batter in the United States, cross-
cultural studies have found that systemic battering does not occur in
all societies.' 5 Significant is the finding that in communities with no
or very low incidents of domestic violence "[t]here are significant
community level sanctions against battering clearly demonstrated by
active community and/or kin intervention when beating begins to
escalate to battering."
3 6
Jacquelyn Campbell suggests that in the United States "it is [now]
time to start applying sanctions at the neighborhood level."13 7  She
132. ScHEcHTER, supra note 11, at 239 (comparing this new form of family to the present
one in privatized society that separates family from community, isolates women, and creates
unresolvable problems concerning violence against women).
133. SeeJacquelyn C. Campbell, Prevention of Wife Battering: Insights From CulturalAnalysis, 14
RESPONSE 18, 20 ("In some societies female groups provide the active community intervention
against potential heating, for instance, presenting a compelling image of the women of a village
surrounding a home where there is marital conflict until the wife comes outside with them.").
134. Id. at 19. This observation was countered by other evidence that even in two societies
where wives have economic independence, battering continues. Id. at 19-20.
135. Id. at 18 (distinguishing between beating, which is a singular act of physical aggression,
and battering, which is a "phenomenon almost exclusively directed toward women").
136. Id. at 20; see alsoJames P. Brady, Sorting Out The Exile's Confusion: OrDialogue on Popular
Justir4 5 CoNTEmp. CRISES 31, 36 (1981) (stating that "the informal sanctions of the community
and the mobilization of public consensus can be a powerful, and yet relatively non-coercive form
of social control").
137. Campbell, supra note 133, at 24.
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further advocates making "individual batterers known to their
communities, their churches, their schools, and their job sites for
public censure. Let us work toward forming community and
neighborhood level groups of women, both for economic solidarity
and solidarity against men who batter."1
3 8
While Campbell offers these suggestions as corollaries to official
state sanctions, 39 perhaps this model could replace state sanctions
such as arrest and incarceration. Otherwise, the neighborhood
community sanctions would only serve as additional aid and power to
the police, thus continuing the cycle of racist oppression. Under my
proposal, community residents will not become agents in their own
oppression, but rather, will take control of their lives and come to one
another's aid.
This proposal might appear vigilantilist' upon first glance, but
not if the implementation of these neighborhood justice programs is
based upon a democratic process by which leaders or facilitators of
these programs would be elected. The civil rights movement, in its
struggle for voting rights and the more recent calls for proportional
representation of minority communities, should serve as an exam-
ple. 14
1
The community would first elect to have a community justice
system. In the spirit of Lani Guinier's voting rights proposals, the
women of the community could have cumulative voting power to vote
for the initial implementation of the program." In other words,the women could pool their votes and thus elect the new system into
138. Campbell, supra note 133, at 24.
139. See Campbell, supra note 133, at 24 (stating that in some communities, neighbors who
are aware of or watch for any indications of violence before it begins, can call the police on
behalf of the woman who is being beaten).
140. I remind the reader that there is no real police accountability to the community in the
first place. The beatings of Rodney King in Los Angeles and Malice Green in Detroit are just
two examples that readily come to mind. See Annette Haddad, L.A. Mayor Calls for Police Chief
"Accountability", Los ANGELES TIMS, Mar. 12, 1991; Dane Parsons, Who'll Police the Police WhenIt
Comes to Brutality?, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at BI; Two Detroit Officers Convicted of
Murder, Third is Acquitted in Beating of Black Motorist, STAR TRIB., Aug. 24, 1993, at 1A.
141. See generally Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-
MemberDistricts, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1135 (1993) (advocating proportional or semiproportional
representation instead of districting in order to achieve political fairness for minority
communities). "Proportionate interest representation takes the idea of democracy by consensus
and compromise and structures it in a deliberative, collective decision-making body in which the
prejudiced white majority is disaggregated." Id. at 1171.
142. "Unlike race conscious districting, which predetermines voting options based on a
concept of group representation, these alternative electoral systems allow contenders to win
representation based on their proportion of the votes actually cast." Id. at 1135-1136.
143. Id. at 1137. Guinier suggests that under the current system, minority votes are diluted
because. votes cast for the losing candidate are wasted, rather than used to represent
proportional strength. Id.
1994]
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 2:171
place in their community.T This process, of course, would require
that the local police abide by this vote and be held accountable to the
community for any infringement on the community control of
domestic violence. Examples of neighborhood organizations for the
purposes of zoning and property laws abound." We must envision
a new kind of community organization that embraces concern and
responsibility for one's neighbors and their physical well-being, rather
than mere property concerns.
VII. CONCLUSION
Women, whether Black or white, undoubtedly want the violence to
stop. Domestic violence is a dangerous reality which all women may
face. Violence in the home is not limited to poor and Black families,
but it is those men and women who most often come within the
control of the legal system. The complexities of domestic violence
policy include contradictions of power among white and Black
women. While white women suffer abuse at the hands of their
husbands and hold an inferior social position because of patriarchy,
white women as a group are also in a position to oppress Black
women and men. Black women also suffer abuse at the hands of
their husbands, but coming face-to-face with state intervention in the
form of mandatory arrest often proves more dangerous than helpful.
An understanding of race and gender power relations is critical for
feminists working toward a safer society for all women. Furthermore,
144. Cumulative voting is one strategy that Lani Guinier suggests to empower minority
groups.
Cumulative voting lowers the threshold of representation to encourage local political
organizations to form. Minority political organizations might then reclaim, at a newly
invigorated grassroots level, the traditional party role of mobilizing voter participation.
Additionally, locally based political parties might then organize around issues or issue-
based coalitions. Since the potential support for the minority political party is not
confined to a geographic or racial base, cross-racial and pangeographic coalitions are
possible.
Id. at 1170.
145. See, eg., Kenneth L. Turchi, Note, Municipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult Entertainment:
Young Its Progeny, and Indianapolis' Special Exceptions Ordinance, 58 IND. LJ. 505, 527 (1983)
(noting that neighborhood organizations in Indianapolisjoined together on a campaign to close
adult bookstores); Peter W. Salsich,Jr., A Decent Home For Eveiy American: Can The 1949 Goal Be
Met; 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1645 (1993) (suggesting that efforts to remove artificial exclusionary
zoning barriers should be undertaken by coordinating a coalition of neighborhood organiza-
tions); Scott Schrader, Book Note, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (1991) (reviewing JOHN C.
COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AEsrTETIcs, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1989)) (stating
that neighborhood organizations were successful in using historic preservation law to affect local
zoning, thereby preventing the demolition of a historic mansion); Peter W. Salsich, Jr.,
Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333, 338 n.10
(commenting that HUD recognized that the relationships between neighborhood organizations,
local government, and the private sector are very important to the revitalization of communi-
ties).
1994] FEMINIST CRITIQuE OF MANDATORY ARREST 199
an understanding of the complexity of mandatory arrest is crucial for
feminists who are working toward eradicating domestic violence.
Mandatory arrest laws represent a policy supporting a white woman's
perspective of the state and its role in protecting them against
violence. Domestic violence policy must be more inclusive and
sensitive to the needs of Black women and cognizant of the racism
inherent in our criminal justice system.

